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 Foreign policy formulation and 
management is quite sensitive. No 
country can either desire or afford to remain isolated 
internationally.  Furthermore, a state is always 
concerned with its security and survival and cannot 
afford to sacrifice national interests.  As a member of 
the international community, states, apart from 
ensuring their national interests are also expected to 
play their due role for international peace and 
stability. Pakistan has always followed a pragmatic 
foreign policy and demonstrated exceptional skills in 
balancing her relations with major powers and 
regional players. Pakistan has also maintained a 
finely balanced policy towards Middle East and Gulf. 
The crises in Yemen, transformation in the Middle 
East and transitional balance of power demand a re-
evaluation of our foreign policy which avoids a zero-
sum game between Iran and Saudi Arabia so that 
Pakistan can also remain relevant to the regional and 
international players. 
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Introduction 
Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi opines that “In order for a country to be relevant to the 
international system, it needs to have: (a) internal stability and a viable sustainable 
system; (b) economic viability and the ability to attract investment from outside; 
and, (c) knowledge, academics and technology”: Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi 
(Rizvi,1993) 
Pakistani foreign policy has been defined by its security issues, especially the 
threat emanating from eastern borders. However, despite all the disadvantages 
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which the country has inherited at the time of its inception, its performance as an 
actor in international forums deserve appreciation and understanding. Being 
strategically important country for great global players, Pakistani leadership have 
demonstrated skillful diplomacy in the conduct of foreign policy. Balancing 
relations between USA and China is one apt example of success story, and 
reorientation of relations with Russia while maintaining relevant to USA is another 
milestone achieved by Pakistan’s successful diplomacy. At the regional level, both 
Iran and Saud Arabia are very important from Pakistan’s perspective, therefore, 
need pragmatic reevaluation of options for remaining relevant to both the regional 
powers. While Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been involved in their regional 
tug-of-war for maintaining regional balance of power, while Pakistan has 
maintained cordial relations with both countries due to cultural, historical and 
religious linkages. The transformation across Middle East and the gulf in the shape 
of regime change, intra state conflicts and dwindling Arab Spring, all have had 
profound impact of the security and political architecture of this region with 
serious consequences in terms of human losses and infrastructure damages, while 
on the regional and global balance of power, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are 
asserting their influence on gaining maximum power in the shape of alliance 
partners and physical involvement in the conflicts, most significantly Syria and 
Yemen. Saudi request for troops participation to Pakistan for war in Yemen and 
Iranian request to Pakistan to stay away   created serious challenges to Pakistan in 
adopting foreign policy which is out of zero –sum and pragmatically futuristic and 
in line with popular public aspirations no to become physically involved in any 
future conflict in Middle East. The complex security situation in Yemen besides 
aggravating the conflict and increased turf war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has 
also generated challenging situations for Pakistan’s foreign policy towards both 
Tehran and Riyadh, especially once both of them are of significant importance to 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s leading role and command of newly established Islamic 
Military Alliance for countering terrorism has also created suspicions in Iranian 
policy planners with respect to Pakistan’s future alignment in the region. 
This article unveils the tug of war between Iran and Saudi Arabia through 
historic lens to establish the nature of friction between the two; identify main 
features of Pakistan’s foreign policy in maintaining and promoting regional and 
international peace and stability and suggesting foreign policy options for 
Pakistan.  
 
Saudi-Iran Rivalry 
 
Genesis of Prevailing Conflict 
 
The account of Saudi – Iranian rivalry can be well understood by analyzing the 
strategic architecture of the region, political comportment of both Iran and Saudi 
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Arabia in regional and international arena, and major power’s interests in the 
regional politics.  
 
Strategic Architecture of the Persian Gulf 
 
The Persian Gulf region is an extension of the Indian Ocean through Strait of 
Hormuz. It is identifiable within the limits of Middle East, lies between Iran to its 
North and Arab Peninsula to its South (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 2013). The littoral states 
in the area includes – narrating anti-clockwise from North – Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain. In order to 
pursue their trades through sea, a vast majority of Arabs have migrated to the 
coastal areas of the regions over the past two centuries, hence creating a multi-
ethnic and multi-culture population. The area spread over in less than one thousand 
kilometers holds immense geostrategic significance from two perspectives: Firstly, 
approximately 27 percent of the world oil supply and 22 percent of the US import 
is met by the countries surrounded by the Gulf (Edwards,1997). The region 
contains world largest oil and moderate gas reserves. The coastal area of the 
Persian Gulf contains more than thirty oil fields which makes the Gulf as “oil 
highway” of the world (Hussein, 2012). Iran is believed to possess the world 
second largest gas reserves. Secondly, the trade routes of the old world pass 
through it due to which the region has always been attached to great powers 
interests. Whether it been the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, the British or the 
Russian, each considered the Persian Gulf as dominating factor in formulating their 
colonial policies in the East (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 2013). The Strait of Hormuz – the 
world most important choke point – adds extra dimensions to the political and 
security canvas of the Gulf. Iran has already given a strategic signal to the great 
powers that it has the capability and will to block the Strait of Hormuz in case its 
strategic interests are jeopardized (Hussein, 2012).  
 
Iranian outlook as a Political Actor  
 
The Iranian character in the modern world political landscape can be divided in 
various phases. The first phase encompasses the pre-1953 era which starts with the 
rise of Raza Khan, later Raza Shah Pahlavi in Persia from 1921-1924 (bin Salman 
Al-Saud,2003). It was the time when the British and other colonial masters – 
submitting to the will of the people – were busy in granting independence to their 
colonies. The British after leaving the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and 
subsequently Palestine in 1948 had no justification in staying in the region. But 
they kept ruling areas which today are known as the United Arab Emirates for the 
sole reason of extracting economic benefits from the regional oil industries. The 
British government had purchased 50 percent of oil share of Anglo-Iranian 
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Company when its navy decided to switch over to oil from coal in 1913(Al-Saud, 
2003).    
During this era Iran’s character as a unitary actor in the international system 
remained restricted to strengthening its territorial integrity without making any 
claim across the Gulf except for Bahrain which they had to eventually drop due to 
strong British stance against the claim. The claim to Bahrain, nonetheless, 
remained alive, though not actively pursued by Iran until 1960 (Al-Saud,2003).  
The main characteristic of Iran’s role in international politics during this era was 
its strong pro-British policies due to domestic economic weaknesses and political 
disorder. This claim can be verified with the historic fact that Iran is the second 
Muslim country – after Turkey – which recognized Israel following the British 
steering (Teller, 2018). 
The second phase commenced in 1953 with the fall of democratically elected 
Iranian Premier Muhammad Mossadegh through a US and UK supported coup 
d’état (Bone, (Ed.). 2005). In late 60s and subsequently during 70s, Iran enjoyed 
balance of power in its favour. During this era under Muhammad Raza Shah 
Pahlavi remained pro-British but at the same time contributed a lot in development 
of the state’s economy. Shah also remained committed in country’s military 
buildup by converting national resource into state’s political influence.  Its military 
power was sufficient to deter its rival Iraq and Saudi Arabia both militarily and 
economically. 
There were, however, no visible signs of Iranian intentions in playing a 
dominant role in the regional politics as its interests were well looked after by 
Britain.  
The third phase covering the period from 1971 to 1979 proved decisive in 
generating a race among the Gulf States for regional dominance. The roots of the 
Saudi-Iran rivalry cold also be traced back in this period. The story begins with the 
British government decision of January 16, 1968 to withdraw its forces from 
Persian Gulf by 1971. The British retreat in December 1971, besides marking an 
end to their one and half century supremacy in the Gulf, had two strategic 
implications towards the regional politics: (1) The Gulf states had to assume the 
responsibility for the regional security against any foreign intervention; and (2) 
Internal differences between states surfaced for tilting regional balance of power 
in their favor (bin Salman Al-Saud, 2003). Though Iran remained the British 
closest ally, but in the regional political landscape Iran started emerging as the 
dominant actor.  
In the post-1979 scenario Iran emerged altogether a different actor in all tiers 
i.e. national, regional and international political fronts. The 1979 Iranian revolution 
was not only crucial in totally changing the domestic fiber of the country, but also 
detrimental in writing a new chapter of Iranian history towards its relations with 
rest of the world. Iran – the closest ally of the West before the fall 1979 – 
transformed into anti-West. Perceiving Tehran’s ambition for spreading its 
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revolution in whole of the Middle East, the White House administration started 
considering Iran as a threat to the US interest. The US support to Saddam Hussain 
in Iran-Iraq War – initiated by Iraq in 1980 – confirms that the US objectives was 
not less than a regime change to a government in Iran more in line with the US 
interests (Blight, Banai, Byrne, & Tirman, 2012). 
Since then the regional tussle between Iran and other Gulf countries especially 
Saudi Arabia has dominated the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. 
 
Saudi Arabia’s Comportment as Political Actor  
 
The role of Arabian Peninsula in emerged in internationally back in 6th century 
with the dawn of Islam.  It was indeed the rise of Islam that played important role 
in shaping the character of modern-day Saudi Arabia (Cordesman, 2003). The 
roots of the today’s Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can be traced back in early 20th 
century when Abd al-Aziz al-Saud established the third Saudi state by attacking 
Riyadh after return from exile. By the start of First World War al-Saud was in 
control of large area including central Arabia, however, western Arabia remained 
with Ottoman Empire (Cordesman, 2003). After many ups and downs and 
interplay of conspiracy theories – sponsored by the West – on September 23, 1932, 
Abd al-Aziz al-Saud created Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – a country in its modern 
form (Cordesman, 2003).  
Riyadh’s journey in international politics started with important meeting of 
King Abd al-Aziz with President Roosevelt on February 14, 1945. In the time-
honoured version of event, the young Saudi Arabia and powerful US contracted a 
marriage of convenience, whereby Riyadh opened its oil fields to Washington and 
Washington undertook to protect Riyadh from external and internal attack 
(Ménoret,2005). After the death of King Abd al-Aziz in 1953 the Kingdom 
remained victim of internal family differences for power and mismanagement of 
the government affairs. However, King Faisal – after becoming king in 1964 – 
effectively dealt domestic and international issues. Besides playing role in Arab-
Israel War-1967 & 1973, resolving issues with Egypt on Yemen, Faisal used “oil 
as weapon” policy which led to massive increase in oil prices, Saudi oil wealth and 
its political influence (Cordesman, 2003). All such developments in Saudi Arabia 
were tangent to the US interests in Middle East.  
King Faisal was murdered in 1975 by his own nephew. Since then the Saudi 
character in regional and international relations has remained pro-US. Whether it 
be the Gulf Wars of 1991 & 2003, or other US objectives in Middle East, Riyadh 
policies do have tincture of Washington’s foreign policy.  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys a special place in the Islamic world due to 
Muslim holiest places (the King is often referred as Khadim-e-Harahmain- 
Sharifain). Its oil wealth – holding the world largest oil reserves – has always been 
source for attraction for the great powers especially the US. Despite all this, the 
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Saudi leadership feels that their country is encircled with enemies (Ramady, 2010). 
This perception of encirclement has been an overriding factor of its alliance with 
the US. Starting from the creation of Israel in the heart of Middle East in 1948, rise 
of Ba’athists in Syria and Iraq, strategic interests of former-Soviet Union and now 
Iran in Yemen, are all determents existing in Saudi foreign policy perception 
(Hussein, 2012). 
 
Iran-Saudi Contentious Bilateral Issues 
 
The regional politics of Middle East revolves around its geostrategic architecture, 
the oil wealth, internal differences between states – especially Iran and Saudi 
Arabia for quest of power. Although both the countries have not confronted each 
other in a military clash but a state of cold war do prevail between them ever since 
British departure from the Gulf in 1971.    
The initial signs of gaps between the two surfaced in 1970 when Iran sought 
Saudi cooperation in organizing regional security. Saudi reluctance indicated that 
their sphere of interests were not identical and, although the Gulf was important 
for both of them, it was not the only area of mutual interests (Chubin, & Tripp, 
2014). Later, the Iranian revolution of 1979 totally transformed its character in 
international politics to which Saudi Arabia was not an exception to react. At 
regional front Saudi Arabia chose Iraq as its close ally, considering it as a potent 
deterrent to Iranian ambitions against Iran.  
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-89) further widen the gap between the two as Iran 
considered it as an attempt by Iraq and its allies – Saudi Arabia and the West – to 
snuff out the revolution (Chubin, & Tripp, 2014). The other important event which 
led to even deterioration of bilateral relations was creation of Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). Saudi Arabia took advantage of the Iran-Iraq War and 
predominant fear in the smaller regional states against spill-over of Iranian 
revolution beyond the limits of their frontiers. In May 1981, Saudi Arabia created 
GCC which included all the regional states except Iran and Iraq.  Iran saw the 
Council as a vehicle for Saudi domination of the Arabian Peninsula (Chubin, & 
Tripp, 2014). The creation of GCC and absence of Iran and Iran had two significant 
implications. Firstly, the Saudi government became successful in establishing its 
influence in smaller Gulf state, hence, tilting the balance of power in its favor. 
Secondly, it paved the way for the US to play direct role in the regional politics.   
Since, them there has been hardly any respite in the tense environment between 
the two. Killing of 402 pilgrims – 275 of them Iranian – during clashes in the holy 
city of Mecca in 1987 and the use of Iraqi and Syrian lands as proxy battle ground 
are the major events contributing towards further polluting the regional security 
environment. 
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Sectarian texture of the Conflict 
 
Most of the Western writers have always been biased in their assessment towards 
the prevailing tension in the Gulf and viewed Iran-Saudi relations with sectarian 
lens.  As a matter of fact, the Iran-Saudi rivalry has never been sectarian in nature 
– until late 2010 when Arab Spring changed the dynamics of the whole Middle 
East region.  
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia lived peacefully under British rule up to 1971. 
Their interstate tussle commenced on single point agent i.e. domination of the 
Persian Gulf as both considered themselves as legal heir of British legacy.   
The Iran-Saudi tug-of-war assumed (or internationally presumed) sectarian 
texture precisely after the outbreak of Arab Spring in 2010.  Again, Arab Spring 
was purely an indigenous movement against the authoritarian Arab regimes. 
Ignited in Tunisia it all of a sudden engulfed whole of the Middle East and uprooted 
many tall idols. The rise of emancipatory forces like ISIS and al-Qaida not only 
changed the entire security and political landscape of the region but also evoked 
sectarian element in the Muslim Arab countries. The leadership of both Iran and 
Saudi Arabia could not keep their countries non-aligned from supporting their 
respective factions in regional / neighbouring countries. 
 
The Recent Episode of Crisis in Yemen 
 
The recent developments in Yemen have given a new dimension to the political 
and security dynamics of the whole of the Middle East. Sharing about 1800 km 
Saudi Arabian southern border, Yemen is the second largest country in Arab 
peninsula. In its population of 24.4 million, 60-65% follow Sunni sect whereas 30-
35% belong to Shiite faction of Islam. Most importantly, Shiite majority areas are 
close to the Saudi border which is serious concern from Saudi perspective.    
For much of the 20th century Yemen existed as two separate countries – 
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY) in the south – before their unification in 1990. Historically the 
country is prone to civil wars. In 1960s, North Yemen plunged into a civil war 
between royalist partisans of   Mutawakkilite Kingdom and the supporters of YAR. 
After unification, the Southerners complaining of political and economic 
marginalization by the government in Sana’a pushed the country into second civil 
war in 1994. The roots of present unrest in Yemen can be traced back in Houthi 
insurgency since 2004, south Yemen insurgency since 2009 and Yemeni 
revolutionary movement since 2011.   
In the prevailing fluid situation in Yemen a number of factions are engaged 
fighting with each other. The known fighting groups include: (1) forces loyal to 
President, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi fighting against all odds; (2) Zaidi Shia rebels 
known as Houthis mostly controlling north and west Yemen; (3) al-Qaida Arab 
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Peninsula (AQAP) in South and South East fighting both Hadi and Houthis`; and, 
(4) newly emerged Islamic State (ISIS) against Hadi, AQAP and Houthi. ISIS has 
also claimed responsibility for conducting suicide bombings in Sanaa in March 
2015.  
In September 2014, Houthis after capturing capital city Sanaa became main 
power brokers, later forcing Mr Hadi to flee the capital Sanaa in February 
2015(Ghobari, & Mukhashaf, 2015). Moreover, there have been reportedly 
deflections in loyalties in Yemeni Army in favour of Houthis. In late March 2015, 
Houthis were close to Aden – the city from where President had been controlling 
the state’s affairs – again forcing Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia and seek its 
intervention (Yemen leader Hadi gets Saudi refuge, 2019). 
 
Impact of Iran-Saudi Rivalry on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 
 
The ongoing rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia especially the outgoing 
situation in Yemen has created a challenging situation for Pakistani leadership as 
whether to involve itself in the crisis or remain neutral in the whole scenario. The 
decision is even difficult as both the staunch rivals are at one hand Muslim states 
and on the other hand are equally strategically important for Pakistan.  
The Saudi demand to Pakistan for physical support to the Yemeni crisis has further 
complicated the issue for Pakistan government in deciding a clear line of action in 
Middle Eastern emerging picture. On the contrary Iran expects Pakistan to remain 
neutral in the ongoing Yemeni crisis.  
In order to follow the correct line of action, it is foremost imperative to first have 
a cursory look over Pakistan’s foreign policy behavior with specific reference to 
maintaining international and regional peace.  
 
Pakistan’s Character in Regional and International Stability  
 
Article 40 of constitution of Pakistan pledges that for preservation and 
strengthening fraternal relations among Muslim countries and global community 
for promotion of international peace and settlement of disputes through peaceful 
means (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973).  
In the post-independence period Pakistan started pursuing cordial relations 
with its neighbors, Muslim World, and other members of world 
society.  Pakistan heritage shows that Pakistan has always played pivotal role in 
promoting and maintaining the world security. After independence this became a 
permanent and regular aspect of Pakistan’s foreign policy. 
 One important character of Pakistan’s past foreign policy behavior has been 
its role towards balancing relations among rival states. By virtue of its strategic 
location and the attachment of great powers vital interests with Pakistan, the 
leadership of Pakistan has historically endeavored to bridge gap between states. 
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This is more specific in relations to Sino-US ties where Pakistan played key role 
in defusing tensions and bringing the both nations closer to each other. In 1970-71 
Pakistan facilitated President Nixon’s historic visit to People Republic of China 
which wrote a new chapter in international relations.  
Pakistan’s role balancing relations for peaceful resolution of conflicts is the 
best model which it can play as a purposeful actor of international community.  
 
Iran-Saudi Rivalry and Available Alternatives for Pakistan  
 
The prevailing situation in Yemen and consistent unrest in bilateral ties between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia is not a sole concern of Persian Gulf or the Middle East 
region but a direct threat to Pakistan domestic and security dynamics. Whether or 
not participating in the conflict is in our best national interest, is a hundred-million-
dollar question which needs to be evaluated from various angles. It is, however, 
imperative that Pakistan’s foreign policy makers must play their cards well in order 
to secure their best national interests.   
States being “rational” actors in the anarchic world system always conduct 
cost-benefit analysis in respect of their long-term national interest before following 
a particular alternative. Principally speaking Pakistan should play its “Active role” 
in the crisis. But what kind of role? We need to first access options to Pakistan.  
Although the joint session of parliament has passed a resolution to remain 
neutral in the whole scenario, but it is not binding on the government to follow the 
resolution in its true spirits as it has to link various bilateral and international 
obligations while formulating its long term foreign policy. Hence, evaluation of all 
domestic, regional and international variables is imperative before taking the final 
decision. This is even important as the government of Pakistan while following the 
principal of ambiguity has not given any clear-cut policy outline. 
While taking advantage of Yemen crisis Pakistan can play important in 
bridging gaps between Iran and Saudi Arabia and contribute positively in ending 
their decades old tussle for balance of power. Apparently, Pakistan has three 
alternatives: (1) remain neutral; (2) show a tilt toward either Iran or Saudi Arabia; 
or (3) follow a pro-active diplomatic action. 
 
Option-1: Remain Neutral 
 
There is a general perception in the masses that Pakistan should remain neutral as 
regards to bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Yemen conflict, 
and concentrate on its domestic issues. The main arguments in support of the 
option include the following. 
 Yemen conflict is not our war. It is a conflict between two Arab states (Saudi 
Arab and Yemen) or a legacy of proxy warfare between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
for power maximization for their regional dominance. 
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 Pakistan has never indulged in any Intra-Arab or Arab-Ajam conflict, e.g. Iran-
Iraq war (1980-88), the ongoing conflicts in Syria, and other Arab country after 
Arab Spring. 
 Pakistan has always followed the principal of non-interference in other states’ 
affairs. Yemen crisis being internal / domestic issue of Yemen should be 
resolved through internal laws of non- interference/state sovereignty.   
 Pakistan has a number of security issues of its own. It has not come out of the 
security crisis emerged as a result of its involvement in the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT). So, Pakistan’s focus should remain on fighting the GWOT 
and ensure its internal peace and stability. 
 The ongoing conflict in Yemen and Iran-Saudi rivalry has acquired 
sectarianism color. The very fiber of Pakistani society is non-sectarian. 
Furthermore, sectarianism is not structural in Pakistani politics/domestic 
issues. By joining the war Pakistan is going to show its tilt towards Saudi 
faction of sects and would create serious security issues at home. Its society 
would be polarized on the basis of sects as 20 million Shiites live in Pakistan 
peaceful (this number is nearly double the Shiites (Houthis) fighting in 
Yemen). 
 The history of country reveals that we have already paid a very price while 
fighting the wars for others. For instance, in 1979 and 2001 Pakistan fought 
for the US interests in the region and resultantly the very social fiber of the 
country has transformed completely. We were not in a position to avoid 1979 
and 2001 but at least in case of Yemen we can afford to remain away from the 
theater of war. 
 There are no two factions fighting in Yemen, rather four groups have been 
fighting against each other since past a decade. These include: a) Houthis in 
the north and south west; b) al-Quaida; c) ISIS; and d) President Hadi’s states 
forces. It would be difficult for Pakistani forces to identify their clear-cut goals 
and objectives as regards to the enemy situation in Yemen.   
 Saudi integrity has not been threatened. It’s Saudi Arabia who has attacked 
Yemen. Sending our forces in Yemen on the pledge of safeguarding Saudi 
territorial integrity it is not logical. 
Though Pakistan can afford to remain neutral, but the option is not recommended. 
 
 
 
Syed Jawad Shah, Waseem Ishaque and Noor Fatima 
Page | 176   Global Regional Review (GRR) 
Option-2: Show Tilt toward either Iran or Saudi Arabia 
 
Although Pakistani parliament has passed a resolution on staying neutral, but 
voices are being herd for sending troops in support for Saudi Arabia. These voices 
are merely from the religious groups who have been getting funds from Saudi 
Arabia since long and some political forces having personal interests / investments 
in Saudi Arabia. A segment of Shiite population believes that Pakistan should show 
whole hearted support to Iran being neighbouring Islamic country. The voices of 
those in favour of Saudi Arabia are rather louder. The main arguments in favour 
and counter arguments include the following. 
 Saudi Arabia is our historic and time-tested friend and should be helped in the 
time of need.  Moreover, Saudi Arabia has always helped Pakistan 
economically, financially and morally during the hour of our need. So, this is 
our time to pay it back. The school of thoughts opposing this ideology believes 
that in international politics there are no “free lunches”. States help others in 
exchange of safeguarding their interests. They also argue that Saudi Arabia’s 
last year’s aid of $ 1.5 billion was an investment which is being cashed today. 
 The supporters of sending troops to Saudi Arabia attach religious affiliation 
with the issue by arguing that the holy places are to be protected. However, the 
holy places are not in danger due to the ongoing crisis in Yemen. 
In view of serious implications for Pakistan at domestic security dynamics, 
sending of troops is not recommended.  
 
Option-3: Pro-active Diplomatic Initiative – Balancing of Relations   
 
The most appropriate role that Pakistan can play in the whole issue - while 
remaining neutral - is to follow a pro-active diplomatic initiative so as to bridge 
gap between Iran and Saudi Arabia and ensure perpetual peace in ME and bring 
harmony in Muslim Ummah. Following arguments would support the suggested 
courses of action. 
 Historically speaking Pakistan has been playing vital role in bridging gaps 
between states. Pakistan – utilizing its geo-strategic significance – played vital 
role in affecting Sino-US rapprochement. In 1970’s, Pakistani leadership 
convinced the US that Chinese may not be taken as communist in lines as they 
consider Soviet Union. Rather, they should be taken as nationalists and hence 
vital to US interest. In 1972 president Nixon paid historic visit to china which 
was made possible by Pakistan’s efforts and wrote a new chapter in 
international history of politics.  
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 Pakistan enjoys equally good and long-term relations with both Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. Saudi Arabia has always rendered its support for Pakistani cause. Its 
financial assistance during crisis moments cannot be ignored. Historically, 
Pakistan has always supported the Saudi cause. In 1990 Pakistan sent its forces 
to join the coalition against Iraq. Earlier in 1980s, a dedicated Pakistani 
military contingent remained deputed in Saudi Arabia on security duties. So, 
their interstate relations are based on long term religious and mutual interests. 
Moreover, a Pakistani workforce of about two million is a bonding factor 
between the two. At one end Saudis are looking after their financial needs and 
Pakistan is receiving huge remittance in its national treasury and on the other, 
the Pakistani Diaspora in Saudi Arabia has been contributing in their nation 
building. It’s a two-way traffic. The best way that Pakistan can pay back to 
Saudi Arabia now, is not short-term assistance in the form of military 
contingent but contribute towards a perpetual peace and stability of Saudi 
Arabia and the ME. It can only be done if Saudis use Pakistan’s influence over 
Iran in resolving their long-term issues.  
 Pakistan and Iran are not only two neighboring states but two important/core 
states of the region. Both have a history of cordial friendly relations and 
convergence of interests on various bilateral, regional and international issues. 
Despite being a Shiite dominated country, the inter-state relations between 
Pakistan and Iran have not been written on the basis of sectarianism. Numerous 
incidents of killing of Shiittes in Pakistan, especially Hazarvis in Quetta has 
not generated any support from Iranian side in favor of a particular sect. This 
shows that the relationship between the two is institutionalized. 
 Further, Pakistan and Iran have mutual economic interests. They have already 
concluded historic Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project (IP). In order to make 
the project feasible peace and security is pre-dominant factor on both the 
countries.  
 The recently concluded historic visit of Chinese President (20-21 April 2015) 
to Pakistan can also be viewed in the same pretax. The commencement of 
economic corridor initiative and IP; does not merit any deployment of 
Pakistani forces on Iran’s border. So, China is also in favour of diplomatic 
solution of Yemen crisis. 
Keeping Pakistan’s geo-strategic location, Pakistan’s relations with both Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are in the country’s vital national interests. Hence, the best 
option for Pakistani leadership in the current scenario is to play a pro-active 
diplomatic role. 
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Recommendations 
 
Recommended option: Option-3. 
 
Salient of the Option / Course of Action 
 
The important contours of the said alternative include the following. 
 
Direct Dialogue with Stake Holders: Pakistan should accelerate its diplomatic 
efforts in having direct talks with both the stake holders i.e. Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
The point of emphasis should be following a solutions-oriented agenda. At the 
moment both the sides are not willing to negotiate. Pakistan’s first effort should be 
to bring both the players on negotiating table. Iran has already given a four-point 
formula for resolving the issue which includes: immediate ceasefire; humanitarian 
assistance to suffering Yemenis; intra-group Yemeni dialogue; and formation of a 
broad based government. 
Pakistan should endeavor to get Saudis point of view on it and endeavor to further 
develop the formula so as to make them reach to a common regional agenda. 
 
Incorporating Regional / Global Players in Peace Process: Turkey has already 
been playing an active role in the issue. Pakistan and Turkey, being historically 
good friends with unanimity of ideas on the prevailing situation can play together 
a decisive role in resolving the issue. In other global players, China does have its 
interests linked with Pakistan relatives to Iran and Saudi Arabia. As Chinese 
leadership is also in favor of political solution of the issue, its influence and role 
in bridging gap between Iran and KSA can be sought. 
Russian interests also converge with Chinese interests and hence involvement 
of the Russian government can help resolving the Yemeni issue. Furthermore, the 
US has, though, been helping Riyadh through logistics and intelligence support but 
would never like to prolong the issue, as it would seriously damage its interests in 
ME. Pakistan by initiating a diplomatic movement towards the great powers (US, 
Russia and China) can bring out a workable formula for establishment of a 
legitimate government in Yemen, as well resolving issue between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia in Persian Gulf. 
 
Role of OIC: The present secretary general of OIC – being Saudi – has complicated 
the organizational role by issuing pro-Saudi statement. However, the other member 
countries can play positive role in resolving the issue. The important aspect to this 
regard is to first convince the OIC meeting. Pakistan then can present a proposed 
formula which could be adopted after discussion. 
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Role of United Nation (UN): In the prevailing inarching system, the UN task is 
the most important. Being member of the UN, Pakistan can play its constrictive 
role. Even participation of Pakistani forces under UN Flag would never give its 
involvement a sectarian color. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Pakistani leadership must realize that it is not our war. We have already paid a very 
heavy toll while fighting for others. However, it does not mean that Pakistan should 
not involve itself in the issue especially once it has the capability to pay a 
constructive role in resolving the issue. Pakistan must involve itself in the Yemeni 
crisis as well as Iran-Saudi tussle and play a constructive role in ensuring lasting 
stability in the region. 
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